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Although works councils have, by and large, equally extensive legal rights in 
Germany and the Netherlands, this is the first econometric analysis that investigates 
the influence of Dutch works councils on firm performance. We use a nation-wide 
Dutch dataset with information on management’s perceptions of the works council’s 
impact on their firms’ efficiency and innovation. Inspired by the German study of 
Jirjahn and Smith (2006), we analyze which determinants influence management’s 
attitude toward employee participation in the Netherlands. We establish a 
preponderant influence emanating from the works council’s role attitude and 
management’s leadership style.  
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1.   Introduction 
In both Germany and the Netherlands, labor relations at the firm level are characterized by a 
very strong form of mandatory worker codetermination (Looise and Drucker, 2003; Top and 
Cremers, 2003). Although the legal rights of Dutch works councils are, by and large, equally 
extensive as those of their German counterparts, extant research almost exclusively focuses 
on the latter. One of the reasons for this probably has to do with data availability. Since the 
mid-1980s, studies on Germany revealed that the presence of works councils can have a 
significant  influence  on  matters  such  as  productivity,  profitability,  innovation  and  labor 
turnover (for overviews, see Addison et al., 2004, and Jirjahn, 2006). In contrast, not a single 
quantitative analysis has been performed in the Netherlands, to date, simply because of data 
unavailability. A comparison of the German and the Dutch setting (CPB, 1997; Top and 
Cremers, 2003) makes clear that, although both systems of codetermination are very similar, 
there are some noticeable differences, both at the enterprise and the workfloor level.  
At the enterprise level, depending on the firm’s size and sector, German workers are 
legally entitled to occupy between one-third and fifty per cent of all seats in the supervisory 
boards of limited liability companies (CPB, 1997). Dutch employees have a much lower 
percentage of delegates on the supervisory board, and these non-executives are assumed to 
take the interests of all stakeholders into account, and not just those of the workers. At the 
workfloor  level,  German  works  councils  have  a  much  more  formal  relationship  with 
management than their Dutch equivalents. This is reflected in the large percentage (16%), 
which is close to zero in the Netherlands, of cases in which German labor representatives 
have gone to court (Top and Cremers, 2003). Rather, works councils in the Netherlands are 
embedded in a culture of consultation, so typical of the Dutch corporatist ‘poldermodel’.  
Recently, a large nationally representative dataset was made available with all sorts of 
information  about  the  way  in  which  Dutch  works  councils  operated  in  1998.  Using  this   2 
database, the current paper reports the first econometric analyses on the − by managers − 
perceived effectiveness of works councils in Dutch establishments, offering the following 
contribution to the literature. First, we follow Jirjahn and Smith’s (2006) study to infer which 
determinants of management’s attitude toward employee participation are significant in the 
Netherlands. Unlike Jirjahn and Smith, we do not have any information about firms without a 
works  council.  However,  contrary  to  their  sample,  which  only  covers  the  manufacturing 
industry, our dataset includes all branches of the private sector. Moreover, we are able to 
distinguish between management’s perception of the works council’s effect on efficiency and 
innovation.  And  finally,  our  data  offer  the  opportunity  to  test  two  extra  hypotheses, 
specifically with respect to the effect of the works council’s role attitude and management’s 
leadership style.   
Our  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  introduce  the  Dutch 
codetermination system. The theoretical background will be elaborated upon in Section 3, in 
which we set out how a works council is expected to affect firm performance. Here, we will 
also formulate predictions with respect to the determinants of management’s perception of 
the  effect  of  codetermination  on  the  firm’s  efficiency  and  innovation.  We  will  explore 
additional  arguments  as  to  the  likely  impact  of  the  works  council’s  role  attitude  and 
management’s leadership style. Next, the data are described in Section 4, after which we 
provide our evidence in Section 5. In the concluding Section 6, we summarize and interpret 
our main findings. 
 
2.   Works councils in the Netherlands 
Codetermination in the Netherlands is mandatory in all sectors of the economy for all firms 
employing fifty or more workers. Among the most important legal privileges of Dutch works 
councils  are  the  right  to  be  informed,  the  right  to  give  advice,  and  the  right  to  provide   3 
consent. What should be stressed is the dualistic nature of the council’s legal task, which is 
typical  for  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  and  which  sets  them  apart  from  most  of  their 
counterparts elsewhere in the world. On the one hand, the works council must stand up for 
the interests of all personnel. On the other hand, the works council is legally obliged to 
operate in the interest of the firm at large. This implies, for instance, that the Dutch works 
council does not have the right to go on strike. 
The works council has the right to be sufficiently informed on all relevant matters so 
as to perform its tasks optimally. Among other things, this information is necessary in order 
to be able to oversee the management’s compliance with the law, with the collective labor 
agreement and with other regulations concerning safety, health and well-being. Next, the law 
entitles  the  works  council  to  be  consulted  on  all  management’s  important  economic 
decisions. This includes decisions about large investments and large loans, and expansion or 
reduction of business activities. The entrepreneur is obliged to ask for the council’s advice in 
time, so that the latter can really be able to influence the decision process. Finally, the works 
council  has  the  right  of  consent  with  respect  to  all  social  arrangements  within  the  firm, 
insofar  as  the  substance  of  the  matter  in  question  has  not  already  been  regulated  in  a 
collective agreement between employers and unions. This includes codetermination not only 
on payment systems, working hours, holidays, health and safety at work, but also on job 
evaluation schemes, training facilities, and rules on hiring, firing and promotion. In order to 
use all these rights effectively, the position of the works council members is legally protected. 
They are allowed – within certain limits – to meet during working hours, to follow training 
courses and to consult outside experts at the expense of the employer. If the works council 
has a case of a management team that does not satisfactorily follow up on their advice or has 
taken a decision ignoring legally required consulting procedures, they have the right to go to 
court. Earlier work revealed that in practice only a minority of all Dutch works councils uses   4 
their rights to the fullest (Everaers, 2006; Cremers, 2007). Usually, individual employers only 
allow works councils to participate in decision-making with respect to personnel policy, and 
to a much lesser extent with respect to strategic issues (Van het Kaar and Looise, 1999).  
Note that Dutch works councils hardly ever have the right to determine wages or other 
fringe  benefits.  For  many  years,  the  unions  have  legally  been  given  precedence  over 
negotiating the terms of employment at the sector level. As soon as wages and working hours 
are settled upon in a collective labor agreement, which applies to the vast majority of the 
Dutch workforce, a works council is not allowed to renegotiate this at the company level. At 
the same time, the direct influence of Dutch labor unions on company policies is limited. 
Contrary to Germany, where works councils are dominated by unions (CPB, 1997), there 
exists no formalized relationship between councils and unions in the Netherlands. Although, 
by the end of the 1990s, 64 per cent of all works councilors were also union members, in 
practice there are no strong ties between Dutch labor unions and works councils (Schilstra 
and Smit, 2005).  
 
3.   Theoretical expectations 
Works  councils  have  the  potential  to  exert  great  influence  on  company  policies,  if  they 
exploit their rights optimally. Freeman and Lazear (1995) contend that each of the works 
councils’ rights can be to the benefit of the entire organization, leading to an increase of the 
‘joint surplus’. First, exchange of information can ensure that parties trust each other more, 
which in turn may improve efficiency. Second, advisory rights may allow workers to come 
up  with  suggestions  and  solutions  to  problems  that  have  an  excess  value.  Third,  co-
determination rights give the employees more control over their own working conditions and 
work security, which prompts them to take a longer-run view of the prospects of the firm. In 
addition, Van den Berg (2004) argues in a variation on principal-agent theory that not only   5 
the  manager  can  be  regarded  as  a  principal  who  needs  to  supervise  the  actions  of  his 
subordinates (agents), but also that the works council too could be regarded as a principal vis-
à-vis  management  when  it  comes  to  monitoring  the  compliance  with  collective  labor 
contracts and the law. Shareholders also benefit from this extra check, because opportunistic 
managers may engage in rent-seeking behavior and their non-observance of (explicit as well 
as implicit) agreements can be noticed by the works council. This could lead to negative 
reputation effects, making it harder in the future to hire qualified personnel (cf. Williamson, 
1985, who applies this notion to unions). 
There could also be a drawback of works councils’ presence. Freeman and Lazear 
(1995) argue that the organization runs the risk that a powerful workforce will only try to 
enlarge the pie in favor of themselves, claiming wage rises and preservation of jobs in an 
irresponsible manner that may lead to lower profits. Another possible negative impact of 
works  councils  on  firm  performance  could  follow  from  their  lack  of  know-how  and  a 
slackening effect on decision-making. Moreover, the operation of a works council involves 
costs in the form of lost working hours due to meetings and schooling of the members, and 
expenses  related  to  the  hiring  of  outside  professionals  and  going  to  court  (Kaufman  and 
Levine, 2000).  
Influenced  by  the  prominent  study  by  Freeman  and  Medoff  (1984),  Bryson  et  al. 
(2006) point to the importance of managerial response to any form of worker voice. They 
claim and find that firm performance greatly depends on the degree in which management is 
inclined to give (representatives of) employees a say in company policies. Hence, the next 
question  then  becomes  in  what  circumstances  managers  can  be  expected  to  take  a  more 
positive or a more negative view toward (the effects of) employee participation. Jirjahn and 
Smith (2006) come up with a series of arguments, subdivided into six categories, as discussed 
below. Because one of the aims of our study is to replicate their German analysis for the   6 
Netherlands, we will adhere to the same categorization. Moreover, in a seventh category, we 
add a few novel hypotheses with regard to both managerial and worker attitudes.  
  The  first  category  involves  general  establishment  characteristics.  We  hypothesize 
that  management’s  attitude  toward  codetermination  is  more  positive,  the  larger  the 
establishment.  Then,  the  complexity  of  the  organization  is  larger.  Limits  to  the  span  of 
control  of  management  may  render  a  good  relationship  with  works  councils  necessary. 
Moreover,  Addison  et  al.  (1997)  reason  that  older  plants  and  their  managers  are  more 
accustomed to worker participation, and may therefore hold a more positive view. So, we 
expect that in younger firms in which the newest production technology is used, management 
is more likely to take a negative view on works councils’ effectiveness.  
  The second category is the structure of the workforce. Jirjahn and Smith (2006) argue 
that management is more likely to advance a cooperative relationship with its personnel when 
the workforce (mainly) consists of highly qualified employees with tenure, because these are 
usually more committed to the firm in the long run. This will increase the likelihood that 
managers think positively about employee participation. This is supported by Delaney and 
Huselid (1996), who argue that firms aim to hire the best-qualified workers and to improve 
the  quality  of  their  current  personnel,  because  they  believe  that  skilled  employees  can 
contribute to the firm’s success. 
The third category relates to principal-agent owner-management issues. Managerial 
incentive schemes can influence management’s motivation as to whether or not to build a 
trustful  bond  with  employees  (Jirjahn,  2003).  Firm  owners  try  to  combat  opportunistic 
behavior of the executive team by means of profit-sharing and/or active monitoring, either by 
the shareholders themselves or by the supervisory board. These control mechanisms may 
have  opposite  effects  on  managers’  intention  to stimulate  a  cooperative  relationship  with 
workers (Jirjahn and Smith, 2006). The introduction of profit-sharing and monitoring may   7 
make managers behave less cooperatively vis-à-vis employees because they become highly 
committed to the owners’ goals, implying that the benefits from allying with owners are 
larger than the costs of breaching implicit contracts with their subordinates. Alternatively, 
profit-sharing  and  monitoring  may  trigger  rent-seeking  managers  to  cooperate  more  with 
employees in order to enhance firm performance, because this cooperation is in their own 
financial gain.  
  The fourth category has to do with the industrial relations system. There are different 
ways in which employers can interact with employees. Bargaining takes place with unions 
while  consulting  is  institutionalized  through  the  works  council,  but  a  manager  may  also 
decide to introduce other forms of worker participation. Alongside the presence of a works 
council, workers may be given direct involvement individually or in the form of production 
teams  with  increased  responsibility.  If  all  individual  employees  are  given  more  say  in 
company decisions, this may indicate that managers prefer this kind of participation as a 
substitute for the influence of a formal works council. Hence, we then expect a negative 
attitude toward the council. If certain specific groups of workers receive participation rights 
in a format other than a works council, it may indicate that managers are positive about 
complementary  forms  of  worker  participation.
  Additionally,  following  Hübler  and  Jirjahn 
(2003), we expect that a collective labor agreement contributes to a constructive view of 
management toward works councils. In a reaction to the claim of Freeman and Lazear (1995) 
that an influential council will seize too large a part of the pie at the expense of shareholders, 
it  can  be  argued  that  a  collective  agreement  between  employer  and  union  eliminates  a 
possible source of distributional conflict between management and works council. Instead, 
councils  are  able  to  concentrate  on  other  firm-related  issues  that  may  improve  the  work 
climate, and thus enhance productivity.
   8 
  The  fifth  category  includes  human  resource  management  (HRM)  practices.  HRM 
policies are used to motivate workers with the ultimate aim to improve firm performance 
(Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Addison, 2005). Successful HRM implies a good relationship 
between the employer, on the one hand, and employees and their representatives, on the other 
hand. Jirjahn and Smith (2006) therefore formulate the expectation that the introduction of 
typical HRM tools is associated with a positive view of managers toward works councils, 
because the latter may be needed to communicate the justification of the HRM arrangements 
to the workforce. In addition, it is hypothesized that HRM policies are especially important in 
periods of downsizing: reductions in employment must be made acceptable, and this can be 
done via communication through the works council (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Cascio and 
Wynn, 2004). Hence, if management intends to reduce the workforce,  a positive attitude 
toward cooperation with the works council will be performance-enhancing.  
  Jirjahn and Smith’s (2006) sixth and final category focuses on market strategy and 
innovation. The type of market in which a firm operates and the type of technology used in 
the production process may also have an impact on labor relations within the firm. With 
respect to the first aspect, Nickell (1999) argues that the more intense the pressure is from 
competitors, the more the need is for managers and workers alike to increase effort. Hence, it 
will be in the interest of management to cooperate with the works council. With respect to the 
second aspect, Jirjahn and Smith (2006) formulate the expectation that if management aims to 
introduce new technologies, it will be of avail to them to have a positive attitude toward 
works councils: via this channel, management can obtain and transmit valuable information 
that might boost innovativeness. It may be important to distinguish between the effects of 
process innovation and  product innovation. Addison et al. (2001) argue that councils are 
likely to oppose the former type of innovation because this may lead to lay-offs, while they   9 
would support the latter type of innovation because this may be beneficial for workers as 
well.  
  We add a seventh category: the interaction between management team and works 
council. Given the theory that managerial responsiveness to worker participation has a great 
impact on firm performance (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Bryson et al., 2006), we formulate 
two additional hypotheses. First, we assume that the management’s leadership style reflects 
their opinion about consulting employees and involving them in firm policies. Consequently, 
we expect that the more executives run the organization in a formal and authoritative manner, 
the more likely it is that they perceive a negative effect from codetermination. Second, we 
expect that the attitude and activeness of the works council also affect the managerial view on 
codetermination. We hypothesize that the more a works council adopts a proactive attitude 
toward company policies, the more this can benefit the whole organization, which in turn 
influences management’s view on the council’s effectiveness positively. 
  We conclude this theoretical exercise by briefly addressing the difference between 
management’s perceptions of the works council’s impact on efficiency and innovation, to 
which  we  refer  as  ‘perceived  efficiency  effect’  and  ‘perceived  innovation  effect’, 
respectively. Characteristics reflecting cost control and profit maximization, such as labor 
flexibility and market strategy, may be more important to explain the perceived efficiency 
effect. Likewise, characteristics reflecting creativity and a pro-worker environment, such as 
the degree of schooling of the workforce and favorable HRM-induced facilities, may be more 
important for explaining the perceived innovation effect.  
 
4.   Data and research method 
In  1998,  a  large  survey  was  conducted  economy-wide  among  Dutch  organizations  that 
operated with a works council. The questionnaire was sent to both the management (board of   10 
directors)  and  works  councils  of  3,500  companies,  government  agencies  and  other 
organizations of whom 656 returned the form: 365 works councils and 423 directors. The 
research was conducted by Van het Kaar and Looise (1999) to establish to what degree Dutch 
works councils had gained influence in the preceding decade. For this paper, we use the 
directors’ survey only. Moreover, the analysis is confined to private sector firms, leaving 203 
observations. The final dataset consists of 142 firms for which all relevant information is 
available. This sub-sample of 142 observations is not significantly different from the larger 
directors’ dataset with 423 respondents.  
Due to the design of the survey, almost all data are perceptual scores from individual 
respondents.  For  both  perceived  efficiency  and  innovation  in  the  codetermination  model, 
Harman’s single-factor test (see Podsakoff et al., 2003) revealed four factors with an Eigen 
value  greater  than  one.  Moreover,  no  single  factor  explained  most  of  the  variance.  The 
calculated  VIF  scores  (all  below  2)  did  not  indicate  multicollinearity.  In  Table  1,  the 
descriptives are presented. As most variables are self-explanatory, we will focus on the two 
dependent  and  our  key  independent  variables  with  respect  to  the  interaction  between 
management teams and works councils.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Dependent variables. Managers were asked whether they think that works councils 
have a substantial positive, neutral or negative impact on efficiency and innovation. If the 
answer  is  affirmative,  we  interpret  this  as  a  positive  view  of  managers  toward  works 
council’s  effectiveness:  15%  of  the  managers  reported  a  negative  view  as  to  the  works 
council’s effect on efficiency, whereas 8% reported a positive view; for innovation, 12% 
revealed a positive view and 11% a negative view. Although the number of observations is 
relatively small, this shows that there is sufficient variation.   11 
Key  independent  variables.  The  first  codetermination  characteristic  is  managerial 
leadership style: 22% has a formal leadership style, which implies being strict and following 
the rules, as opposed to a more cooperative style. The second codetermination feature is 
works council attitude. In 43% of the cases, councils have a proactive stance, which implies 
that they actively influence company decision-making. In 27% of the firms, councils strictly 
focus on monitoring. The more passive councils that mainly communicate with management 
serve as reference category.  
Due to the small size of the dataset, extra attention is paid to the distribution of the 
variables. A significant difference in the perceived efficiency effect can be observed between 
formal  authoritative  and  informal  cooperative  management  styles,  whereas  there  is  no 
difference between proactive and monitoring works councils (p=0.048). For the perceived 
innovation effect, both  management’s leadership style (p=0.049)  and a monitoring  works 
council (p=001) are significant. A multivariate analysis will be done by performing ordered 
probit. The advantage is that we can make a clear distinction between a positive and negative 
attitude of managers to works councils’ effects on efficiency and innovation. 
 
 
5.   Empirical results 
In Table 2, the outcomes of the ordered probit analyses are shown, as well as the marginal 
effects, with regard to managerial perception of works councils’ effects on both efficiency 
and innovation. Taken as a whole, the results of the replication of the Jirjahn and Smith 
(2006) analysis (columns 1 and 5) improve when we additionally include the three variables 
that measure how management teams and work councils interact (columns 2 and 6). This 
supports our argument that this interaction matters. We focus on this codetermination model 
in analyzing the managerial perception of works council effects.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]   12 
Starting with general establishment characteristics, firm size does not play a noteworthy role. 
For firm age, we can infer that in younger firms in which the newest production technology is 
used,  management  is  indeed  more  likely  to  be  pessimistic  about  works  councils’ 
effectiveness. Apparently, in younger firms, management teams and works councils still have 
to get used to one another.  
The four variables reflecting the structure of the workforce show mixed results. The 
perceived  innovation  effect  of  a  large  proportion  of  higher  educated  staff  is  positive, 
confirming  the  notion  that  management  is  more  likely  to  support  a  works  council  that 
predominantly represents higher qualified personnel, as this can be seen as an investment. For 
the  perceived  efficiency  effect,  a  negative  influence  of  an  increase  in  labor  flexibility  is 
found, confirming the logic that managers prefer to collaborate with a works council when 
this body mainly represents committed workers with tenure. However, a higher number of 
temporary workers, surprisingly, are associated with a positive view of management on the 
works council’s contribution to efficiency. An interpretation might be that as cheaper and 
flexible temporary workers are thought to positively affect efficiency, management believes 
that this co-opts the works council to support this efficiency-enhancing strategy that does not 
directly affect their tenured constituency.  
As  to  principal-agent  owner-management  issues,  we  find  interesting  results. 
Supervision  by  financially  involved  stakeholders  (i.e.,  the  active  owners)  positively 
influences the perceived efficiency effect, whereas monitoring by a neutral supervisory board 
negatively  influences  the  perceived  innovation  effect.  The  former  result  indicates  that 
shareholder  activism  incites  rent-seeking  managers  to  cooperate  with  the  works  council 
because that is in their best interest when striving after efficiency. The latter finding suggests 
that highly committed managers mainly aim to serve the interests of their principals, and are 
therefore less inclined to collaborate with the works council when innovation is considered.    13 
For the perceived innovation effect, we find opposite results for the two variables 
related to profit-sharing.  It stands to reason to  find a positive  effect if the incentive pay 
system is designed for the whole workforce. After all, the works council acts for all workers, 
and collaboration may increase innovative efforts. On the contrary, when just higher staff 
receives bonuses, this suggests a more negative attitude of managers toward works councils, 
as the latter can be expected to be opposed to this preferential scheme.  
The  findings  for  the  variables  reflecting  the  industrial  relations  system  are  as 
hypothesized,  especially  as  regards  to  the  perceived  efficiency  effect.  A  collective  labor 
agreement has a positive effect on managerial attitudes toward the council, because then both 
parties are not engaged in any conflicts about remuneration but can concentrate on matters 
affecting a smooth work organization. Giving a say in company affairs to quality circles is 
indeed seen as a complement to works councils, whereas giving more influence to individual 
employees is seen as a substitute. Apparently, the management’s goal to increase efficiency is 
perceived to be best taken care of if participation is organized collectively. 
The  variables  linked  to  HRM  practices  show  outcomes  partly  in  line  with  our 
expectations. The distinction between the insignificant effect of HRM measures on perceived 
efficiency and the positive effect on perceived innovation is clear. HRM policies stimulate 
and motivate workers in innovative firms. Managers that aim at efficiency believe they do not 
need works councils to communicate and implement HRM measures. 
For market strategy and innovation variables, several noteworthy significant results 
show up. Management’s plans to increase market share (by entering into some form of joint 
venture with foreign firms) lead to a more positive attitude of managers as regards to the 
council’s contribution to efficiency. Internationalization requires the support of personnel. At 
the same time, if management experiences increasing competitive pressure, the perceived   14 
efficiency effect turns significantly negative, which suggests that in those circumstances the 
managers do not appreciate the council’s input.  
Both types of innovation are positively  related  to the perceived innovation effect, 
indicating that management believes to benefit from the support of the works council. With 
respect to the negative perceived efficiency effect, introducing a new product line requires 
considerable start-up costs to the detriment of efficiency. Consulting the works council may 
amplify this effect even further for at least two reasons: first, such codetermination processes 
take time; and second, works council members might initially oppose such plans because they 
fear an increase of the work load.  
  Finally, and most interestingly, we find the strongest effects if we add three variables 
that represent interaction between management teams and works councils. Our assumption 
that a very formal leadership style contributes negatively to the managerial opinion of the 
council’s effectiveness is convincingly confirmed. And if we look at the effect of the stances 
of a works council, we may deduce that a pro-active council is not appreciated at all by 
executives, neither is a council that engages in strict monitoring whether management fulfils 
its duties and implements decisions properly. Apparently, in the perception of managers, a 
works council is most effective when it only takes a passive stance. 
Looking  at  effect  sizes  requires  calculating  the  marginal  effects.  As  the  marginal 
effects  for  the  three  distinguished  categories  of  variables  add  up  to  zero,  only  two  are 
presented in columns 3-4 and 7-8. Some effects, measured in percentage point changes, are 
quite large. Here we illustrate this with one of our key variables. A formal leadership style 
increases the probability of a negative perceived efficiency effect with almost 19 percentage 
points and decreases the probability of a positive effect with 3.5 percentage points. For the 
perceived  innovation  effect,  the  changes  in  probability  are  6  and  -3  percentage  points, 
respectively.    15 
6.   Conclusion  
In this paper, management’s perception of the works council’s impact on firm performance is 
analyzed. It is the first empirical paper that econometrically analyzes Dutch data. Our study is 
inspired by and moves beyond the work of Jirjahn and Smith (2006). Our final results are 
quite different from theirs. With our data, we cannot differentiate between firms with and 
without a works council, nor could we explore issues of causality. We can however elaborate 
on  the  behavior  of  the  councils  (passive,  monitoring  or  proactive)  and  the  attitude  of 
management toward employee participation (formal versus cooperative). Firm performance 
impact is operationalized as the managers’ perceived effects of works councils on efficiency 
and innovation. 
A  first  finding  worth  mentioning  relates  to  the  large  differences  in  results  when 
comparing the perceived efficiency with the perceived innovation effect. Apart from our key 
explanatory management team – works council interaction variables, hardly any determinant 
scores significantly on both items at the same time. Our most noteworthy and robust finding 
refers exactly to the measures on how management and council approach each other. This 
supports  our  argument  that  the  way  in  which  management  and  council  interact  plays  an 
important  part  in  determining  which  factors  influence  managerial  perceptions  of  works 
council’s effectiveness. Our first hypothesis that a formal leadership style leads to a negative 
perception of the works council’s effectiveness, is confirmed; our second hypothesis that a 
proactive works council will be appreciated by management, is rejected. Looking at the joint 
results  of  these  two  hypotheses,  we  may  conclude  that  if  managers  would  have  a  more 
cooperative  leadership  style  combined  with  a  passive  works  council,  a  more  positive 
impression of the merits of a works council emerges. This could help to increase efficiency 
and stimulate innovation, contributing to a smooth operation of the firm.   16 
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Table 1. Descriptives  
Variable  Freq  Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max 
Perceived effect works council on efficiency 
•  negative 
•  neutral 









     
Perceived effect works council on innovation 
•  negative 
•  neutral 









     
General establishment characteristics 
Establishment size (categorical variable)    3.190  1.44  1  6 
Technology at the newest level (%)
a  123  13.337  18.13  0  100 
Industry dummies:  
- manufacturing 
- construction, and housing industry 
- transportation, trade, services, and hotel and catering industry 









     
Structure of the workforce 
Workforce by function:           
- proportion of blue-collar workers    24.852  25.84  0  90 
- proportion of white-collar workers    47.391  26.03  0  100 
- proportion of higher educated staff    27.757  18.62  2  100 
Workforce by type of contract:           
- proportion of workers with a fixed contract    86.887  8.78  60  100 
- proportion of workers with a temporary contract    6.845  5.68  0  30 
- proportion of workers from a temping agency    6.370  6.29  0  30 
Increasing labor flexibility    .930  .26  0  1 
Principal-agent owner-management issues 
Profit-sharing for all personnel    .859  .87  0  1 
Increasing influence of shareholders (active owners)    .380  .49  0  1 
Quotation on the stock exchange (profit-sharing higher personnel)    .366  .48  0  1 
Presence of supervisory board    .711  .45  0  1 
Industrial relations system 
Participation in quality circles
b    .500  .50  0  1 
Participation of individual employees    .627  .49  0  1 
Collective labor agreement    .683  .47  0  1 
Human resource management practices 
Reorganization (in 1996-1997)    .423  .50  0  1 
HRM practices combined (factor; sum of 12 three-point scale practices)
c    27.359  3.83  18  34 
Market strategy and innovation 
Development competition in past three years (decreased – increased)    3.063  .77  1  4 
Development internationalization
 d    .451  .63  0  1 
Process innovation (factor)
e    8.592  1.34  6  12 
Product innovation (factor)
f    8.908  1.44  6  12 
Interaction between management teams and works councils 
Formal leadership style    .218  .41  0  1 
Works councils’ attitude:            
- passive works council     .338  .47  0  1 
- proactive works council     .417  .50  0  1 
- monitoring works council    .245  .45  0  1 
Number of observations  142         
Data source: Van het Kaar and Looise (1999). 
a Due to a large number of missings on this item (13%), a dummy for the missings has been included. 
b These are teams of employees that are involved in improving production processes. 
c Using factor analysis, we have combined a total of 12 three-point scale measures of HRM practices running  
from informing personnel via job evaluation conversation to team building.  
d Past, present and expected future international cooperation, mergers and acquisitions. 
   e This combines the criteria ‘efficiency’ and ‘flexibility in the firm’ with the market requirements ‘to produce 
for the lowest price’ and ‘to provide a large choice’.  
  f This combines the criteria ‘to improve the quality of products’ and ‘to develop new commodities’ with the  
market requirements ‘producing the highest quality’ and ‘producing a unique product’.   19 
Table 2. Ordered probit analyses of perceived efficiency and innovation  
    Perceived effect works council on efficiency  Perceived effect works council on innovation 
    Coefficients  Marginal effects  Coefficients  Marginal effects 












    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Establishment size  -0.343  -0.177      -0.344  -0.216     
General 
establishment 
characteristics    (-0.76)  (-0.37)      (-0.81)  (-0.46)     
  Establishment size squared  0.065  0.048      0.0535  0.035     
    (1.03)  (0.73)      (0.91)  (0.53)     
  Technology at the newest level
a  -0.024**  -0.028***   .004  -.002  -0.011  -0.013*   .001  -.001 
    (-2.49)  (-2.69)      (-1.44)  (-1.69)     
  Industry dummies included  Yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes   
                  Structure of the 
workforce  % blue-collar workers  -0.004  -0.01      0.003  0.000     
    (-0.72)  (-1.25)      (0.53)  (0.01)     
  % higher educated staff  -0.001  -0.003      0.012*  0.015*  -.001   .001 
    (-0.12)  (-0.32)      (1.65)  (1.81)     
  % workers with temporary contract  0.041  0.048*  -.008   .003  -0.020  -0.023     
    (1.60)  (1.80)      (-0.86)  (-0.85)     
  Increasing labor flexibility  -0.958*  -0.994*   .083  -.129  0.012  0.138     
    (-1.812)  (-1.82)      (0.02)  (0.26)     
                 
Profit-sharing for all personnel  0.16  0.168      0.226  0.292*  -.020  .020 




Increasing influence shareholders (active 
owners) 
0.508*  0.589* 
-.082   .041 
0.010  -0.129 
   
    (1.79)  (1.89)      (0.04)  (-0.43)     
  Quotation on the stock exchange (profit 
sharing for higher personnel) 
-0.522  -0.486 
   
-0.743**  -0.623* 
 .052  -.039 
    (-1.58)  (-1.40)      (-2.31)  (-1.77)     
  Presence of supervisory board  -0.310  -0.197      -1.123***  -1.045***   .053  -.116 
    (-1.078)  (-0.65)      (-3.54)  (-2.91)     
                  Industrial relations 
system  Participation quality circles  0.642**  0.599**  -.092   .037  0.240  0.201     
    (2.27)  (2.02)      (0.89)  (0.68)     
  Participation individual employees  -0.642**  -0.731**   .100  -.054  -0.547**  -0.601**   .037  -.050 
    (-2.40)  (-2.56)      (-2.10)  (-2.10)     
  Collective labor agreement  0.755**  0.713**   -.131   .034  0.247  0.195     
    (2.45)  (2.23)      (0.85)  (0.61)       20 
HRM practices                   
  Reorganization (in 1996-1997)  0.191  0.104      -0.041  0.094     
    (0.71)  (0.37)      (-0.15)  (0.31)     
  HRM practices combined  0.035  0.020      0.071*  0.084**  -.006   .006 
    (0.97)  (0.52)      (1.94)  (2.01)     
                  Market strategy and 
innovation  Development competition  -0.602***  -0.662***   .101  -.039  -0.138  -0.299     
    (-3.33)  (-3.42)      (-0.83)  (-1.58)     
  Development internationalization  0.402*  0.402*  -.061   .024  -0.042  -0.079     
    (1.75)  (1.65)      (-0.20)  (-0.33)     
  Process innovation   0.119  0.107      0.174*  0.204*  -.014   .014 
    (1.22)  (1.06)      (1.84)  (1.92)     
  Product innovation   -0.160*  -0.160*    .024  -.009  0.199**  0.238**   -.016    .017 
    (-1.74)  (-1.69)      (2.19)  (2.33)     
                 
Formal leadership style    -0.891**   .187  -.035    -0.629*   .061   -.033 
    (-2.49)        (-1.77)     
Interaction between 
management teams 
and works councils 
Proactive works council    -0.546*   .088  -.031    -0.947***   .079  -.065 
      (-1.79)        (-2.91)     
  Monitoring works council    -0.452        -1.612***   .230  -.076 
      (-1.43)        (-4.19)     
                   
  Observations  142  142      142  142     
  LR  46.17  56.17      41.99  69.42     
  Prob > chi2  0.004  0.001      0.013  0.000     
  Pseudo R2  0.236  0.287      0.210  0.348     
Data source: Van het Kaar and Looise (1999). 
a Due to a large number of missings on this item, a dummy for the missings has been included. 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(1) and (5): replication, adding and adjusting characteristics used in Jirjahn and Smith model (2006). 
(2) and (6): adding interaction between management teams and works councils. 
(3) and (4): marginal effects based on column (2). 
(7) and (8): marginal effects based on column (6). 
 
 